Haiti's Constitutional Choice: A State for All or Few?
Since most people will not read this full article, I have placed the summary and recommendations at the top for easy access.
Summary Recommendations
The Avant-Projet offers a mix of innovation, contradiction, and confusion. It includes promising shifts, like the recognition of diaspora rights, but undermines them through exclusionary clauses and logistical overreach. To align the document with its stated goals and improve its coherence and functionality, I recommend the following modifications:
Amend or strike Article 65-1, which elevates all communal sections to full communes. Instead, define clear criteria for commune status based on population, infrastructure, and administrative capacity. Consider allowing mayors to serve concurrently in Parliament to reduce the number of elected officials and better connect local and national governance.
Revise Article 73 and related clauses to remove restrictions on dual nationality for candidates seeking public office, except for the presidency. This change would reconcile a core contradiction between Article 11, which affirms full civil, political, economic, and social rights for Haitians of origin, including dual nationals, and other provisions that effectively bar them from running for office. The constitution must reflect this recognition in practice, not only in principle.
Revise Article 85 to eliminate the direct election of departmental governors. Instead, departmental assemblies should appoint their executive leaders. Consolidate or eliminate overlapping roles, such as governors and delegates, to streamline subnational governance.
Revise Article 99 to narrow immunity for parliamentarians and ministers. Immunity should protect political speech and legislative action, but not shield criminal behavior. Lawmakers must be subject to prosecution like all citizens, with appropriate safeguards against political retaliation.
Add a new article establishing a formal impeachment mechanism to allow Parliament to remove the President. Since the President is both head of state and head of government under the Avant-Projet, a well-defined removal process is essential to maintain democratic accountability.
Revise all articles that require candidates for elected office to hold a profession, trade, or property ownership—a standard currently found in Article 73 and others. These requirements disproportionately exclude low-income and informal workers and replicate social hierarchies that have long undermined Haitian democracy. Candidacy should be based on civic commitment and local residency, not wealth or occupation.
A constitution is more than legal text—it is a mirror reflecting our values and aspirations. This document is not perfect, nor should we expect it to be. The U.S. Constitution required immediate amendments and continues to evolve centuries later. What matters is whether this draft provides a foundation strong enough to build upon.
The choice before the Haitian people is not between this imperfect draft and some ideal constitution that may never exist. Nor is it between this proposal and our current constitution, which everyone acknowledges is inadequate. The real choice is between taking a measured step toward better governance or remaining trapped in a system that has repeatedly failed us. At the very least, it opens a conversation about Haiti's system of governance.
Haiti's future depends on our willingness to build something better, even if it means starting with something imperfect. The question is not whether this constitution satisfies every grievance, but whether it creates better mechanisms for governance, representation, and accountability than what we have today. That requires honest engagement with both strengths and weaknesses—not reflexive rejection or uncritical acceptance.
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As Haiti embarks on yet another effort at national reconstruction, a new draft constitution—the Avant-Projet de Constitution (Avant-Projet)—has been released by the Comité de Pilotage under the oversight of the Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT). The document proposes sweeping changes to the country's system of governance and arrives at a moment of deep national uncertainty.
There are legitimate grounds for opposing this effort. Some reject any attempt to modify the 1987 Constitution. Others object to the process itself, questioning the authority of the CPT to appoint a Comité de Pilotage or to lead constitutional reform. Still others may agree on the need for change but dispute the substance of what has been proposed. These concerns are valid and deserve thoughtful consideration within Haiti's current political and institutional context.
What is clear is that there had been broad agreement in the past among the population on the need to amend the Constitution. The question for us is whether upcoming elections should proceed under a framework that most agree is flawed, or whether changes should be made in advance. And if reform is the path forward, should it take the form of amendments or a complete rewrite of the Constitution?
This debate ultimately forces us to confront a fundamental question: what kind of nation-state do we want to build? Is it one that includes or excludes? One built for the few or made by and for the many? Haiti remains a profoundly divided nation, plagued by mistrust in government, civil society, and the diaspora alike. In this context, the real issue is not whether this Avant-Projet satisfies every grievance, but whether it offers a more workable structure for governance than the status quo.
Reforming the Executive and Legislative Branches
There has long been a consensus among legal scholars, policymakers, and citizens that the 1987 Constitution requires urgent revision. Even its staunchest defenders acknowledge the need to align electoral calendars, rebalance power between the executive and legislative branches, advance meaningful decentralization, and clarify the political status of Haitians abroad.
Living in the United States, I have come to value institutional balance. The U.S. Constitution has endured not because it is perfect, but because it is respected. Haiti has not developed a similar culture of legal continuity. Our task now is to create something distinctly Haitian, rooted in our realities but committed to a core principle: that power must be exercised, checked, and held accountable.
The president, once elected, should have the power to govern. I support removing or at least changing the Prime Minister's position, which was used as a political bargaining chip to destabilize governments and fuel corruption. Consider Haiti's recent history: Prime Ministers have averaged less than two years in office since 1987, with frequent resignations triggered not by policy failures but by parliamentary maneuvering for personal gain.
The Avant-Projet makes no mention of a required déclaration de politique généralefrom the executive to Parliament, signaling a move toward a more centralized presidency. While this may streamline governance, it risks weakening legislative oversight. This should not be a return to the bygone era of all-powerful presidents like the Duvaliers. To maintain democratic balance, the Avant-Projet should establish a clear impeachment process, giving Parliament the authority to remove a president who abuses power.
Simultaneously, Article 99 should be revised to narrow immunity for parliamentarians and ministers. Immunity should protect lawmakers' political work, not shield them from justice. Too many legislators have hidden behind parliamentary immunity to avoid prosecution for corruption and other crimes. Parliamentarians must be subject to prosecution like any citizen, with safeguards to prevent political abuse but no protection for criminal conduct.
Dual Citizenship: Ending the Hierarchy of Belonging
The Avant-Projet's approach to dual nationality reveals a deeper contradiction about who belongs in Haiti's future. Article 11 proudly declares that Haitians of origin, including those with dual nationality, enjoy full civil, political, economic, and social rights. This recognition of the diaspora's vital role is long overdue.
Yet Article 73 undermines this promise, stating that candidates for office must "be Haitian of origin, never have renounced Haitian nationality, and not hold any other nationality at the time of registration." Similar exclusions appear throughout the document.
This contradiction reflects Haiti's longstanding practice of creating hierarchies among its people. For 221 years, domestic elites have presided over institutional decay, economic collapse, and misgovernance. Now, in Article 73, the Comité wants to codify an exclusionary policy against a diaspora that had been pushed out of their country. We cannot be both Haitian and not Haitian enough.
Indeed, the exclusion of dual nationals mirrors how we've historically treated rural Haitians—the “moun andeyò (the people outside). Several articles, which require candidates to hold property or recognized professional positions, create barriers that exclude most Haitians from leadership. In a country where the majority live in poverty and informality, this effectively tells people: you may vote, but you may not lead.
"Another critique is that the diaspora would have dual loyalties and cannot faithfully serve Haiti. Yet professionals routinely distinguish between personal identity and institutional responsibility. Judges rule on cases where there are issues with which they personally disagree. Diplomats represent administrations and support policies they may not personally support. The notion that dual nationals cannot faithfully serve Haiti ignores this basic principle of public service. What should matter is the depth of one's connection to the community. If someone seeks to represent a locality, requiring that they have lived there and understand local needs is a fair requirement. But additional citizenship should not disqualify them from service. However, I believe the presidency should be an exception. Given its symbolic and sovereign weight, requiring that the head of state hold only Haitian citizenship is reasonable.
Decentralization: Ambition Versus Capacity
The Avant-Projet's approach to local governance illustrates the tension between democratic ideals and practical governance. Article 65-1 transforms all existing communal sections and chefs-lieux into full communes: "Tous les chefs-lieux de commune ainsi que toutes les sections communales à la date d'adoption de la présente Constitution sont désormais élevés au rang de communes."
This reform would create over 570 new mayors and municipal assemblies, nearly quadrupling local elected positions overnight. In theory, this represents meaningful decentralization. In practice, it could overwhelm our already fragile administrative system. Where will we find 570 qualified mayors? How will we fund 570 municipal budgets? Who will provide oversight to prevent corruption from multiplying across hundreds of new offices?
Rather than automatic elevation, the Avant-Projet should establish clear criteria for commune status based on population, infrastructure, and administrative capacity. Communities that meet these standards could apply for commune status through a structured process that ensures they can function as local governments.
The Avant-Projet also proposes replacing presidentially appointed departmental delegates with elected governors (Article 85). While democratic selection is always preferable to presidential appointment, creating another layer of full-time executives will add more bureaucracy than value. Departmental assemblies could instead appoint presidents from among their members to coordinate regional governance, reducing administrative costs while preserving local accountability.
Foreign Land Ownership: Separating Facts from Hysteria
Since the publication of the Avant-Projet, critics have falsely claimed that Article 19 will allow unlimited foreign land ownership and control over underground resources. This is pure fiction and an attempt at clickbait.
The state retains full control over natural resources. Article 39-5 states that "les rivages de la mer, les sources, rivières, cours d'eau, mines et carrières sont propriété publique de l'État"—coastlines, springs, rivers, watercourses, mines, and quarries remain state property. Mining rights and resource extraction stay under state authority, contradicting claims about foreign resource control.
Foreign land ownership also faces explicit restrictions. Article 59-1 limits foreign residents to "une seule maison par arrondissement"—one house per district—and prohibits rental operations. Article 59-2 allows foreign ownership for "des fins agricoles, commerciales, industrielles, religieuses, humanitaires ou éducatives"—agricultural, commercial, industrial, religious, humanitarian, or educational purposes—but only within legal limits.
Additional safeguards prevent foreigners from owning property on national borders (Article 59-3), property rights expire five years after they stop residing or operating in Haiti (Article 59-4), and violations face legal punishment (Article 59-5). These provisions create a framework for controlled foreign investment while protecting sovereignty. The hysteria conflates land ownership with resource extraction—two entirely separate legal domains.